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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Under the banner of the new regionalism, the past decade has witnessed a 
revival of academic and political interest in the region as a strategic site for 
economic activity and scale for socially integrating civil society. What remains 
unclear though are the ‘actual mechanisms’ that connect this new politics of 
economic development with transitions in the regulation and governance of 
contemporary capitalism and its territorial form. This article seeks further 
connection by distinguishing between the processes of centrally orchestrated 
regionalism and regionally orchestrated centralism in the production of regions. 
While sympathetic to the general tenor of the new regionalism, this article 
presents an account of England’s unique new regionalist policy experiment to 
pose searching questions relating to the future direction of the new regionalism. 
Arguing that the new regionalism remains a fruitful avenue for unravelling the 
processes involved in the production of spatial scale(s), the article concludes that 
uncovering the politically-charged processes involved in the production of 
subnational space remains an urgent task for urban and regional scholars. 
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STATING THE PRODUCTION OF SCALES: CENTRALLY ORCHESTRATED 
REGIONALISM, REGIONALLY ORCHESTRATED CENTRALISM 
 
 
“Functions…do not naturally reside at any one scale, but are variously 
institutionalized, defended, attacked, upscaled, and down-scaled in the 
course of political-economic struggles. Correspondingly, the present 
scalar location of a given regulatory process is neither natural nor 
inevitable, but instead reflects an outcome of past political conflicts and 
compromises.” 
 Peck (2002: 340) 
 
1 Introduction 
 With the crisis in Atlantic Fordism prompting the demise of the Keynesian 
welfare state, the primacy afforded to the nation-state as the site and scale at 
which economic management is conducted, social welfare delivered, and political 
subjects are treat as national citizens has been challenged by the emergence 
and institutionalization of new state spaces (Brenner et al, 2003; Brenner, 2004). 
Bound up with this, the recognition that spatial scale and the successful 
coordination of economic activity are ‘deeply intertwined’ (Swyngedouw, 1997a) 
has provided the backdrop for geographers fascination with uncovering the 
‘processes’ involved in the production of spatial scale(s) and associated 
geographies of rescaling (for overviews of the ‘scale debate’ see Herod and 
Wright, 2002; Sheppard and McMaster, 2004). The task at hand has been to 
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connect the new politics of economic development with transitions in the 
regulation and governance of contemporary capitalism and its territorial form 
(Jones, 2001). 
While it was some time ago that Swyngedouw (1997b: 141) suggested 
that “scale (at whatever level) is not and can never be the starting point for 
sociospatial theory [but that] the kernel of the problem is theorizing and 
understanding ‘process’”, a new era in the ‘scale debate’ is emerging centred on 
three distinct yet related problematic in human geography: human geography 
with or without scalei
For many commentators, globalization is a relentless force that 
increasingly defines the parameters of our daily lives (Dicken, 2007). In such 
accounts, the complex web of flows and processes spawned by globalising 
forces appear to have homogenised practice across an increasingly borderless 
world. Much less evident in the prevailing discourse but surely of equal 
importance and practical significance has been a new regionalism. Not to be 
viewed as the antithesis of globalisation, the new regionalism represents the 
 (Jonas, 2006; Jones et al, 2007; Marston et al, 2005); state 
rescaling or beyond state rescaling (Brenner, 2004; Brenner et al, 2003; 
Mansfield, 2005); and, non-territorial/networked/relational or 
territorial/networked/relational conceptualisations of spatiality (Allen and 
Cochrane, 2007; Geografiska Annaler, 2004; Jones and MacLeod, 2004)? 
Binding them together is the continued quest to understand how sites and scales 
are produced, reproduced, even disappear. Here two forces have come to 
dominate the way we conceptualise the world around us. 
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conceptual belief that while some flows and processes are becoming increasingly 
unrooted from the confines of place, a range of countervailing processes are 
increasingly grounded in nodes of intense economic and social activity ii
The establishment of a Scottish Parliament, Assemblies for Wales, 
Northern Ireland and London, and Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) 
within the English regions were testament to the belief of the incoming Labour 
Government (1997) in the rhetoric of devolution and the new regionalism. But the 
politics does not stop there because for one territory the institutionalization of a 
new regionalist tier of subnational government remained incomplete. Left as the 
sole territory without additional elected political representation, attention soon 
focused on England’s more modest form of devolution. It was, however, to be a 
. The 
dominant discourse of its day, the new regionalism documented how the region 
came to represent a focal point for knowledge creation, learning, and innovation 
(Amin and Thrift, 1994; Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Florida, 1995; Scott, 1998; 
Storper, 1997) whilst also being deemed a crucial site for promoting a plural 
society centred on participatory democracy, active citizenship, and civic pride 
(Amin, 1999; Keating, 1998). Presenting the region as the focal point of post-
Fordist political-economy, the new regionalist orthodoxy of the mid-to-late-1990s 
was particularly important given its currency amongst academics, policymakers 
and practitioners across North America, Western Europe and beyond (Hettne et 
al, 1999; Keating, 1998; Kipfer and Wirsig, 2004). Notwithstanding this, the levels 
of political belief shown by the United Kingdom Government in the new 
regionalism during this period were particularly noteworthy.  
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further five years before the Labour Government fired the starting gun on 
England’s ascent to a fully democratised regional government – the proviso 
being that each region demonstrated a strong level of support in a regional 
referendum (Department of Transport, Local Government and Regions, 2002). 
Despite being held in the North East region, the de facto home of English 
regionalism, the first regional referenda held on 4 November 2004 witnessed the 
unanimous rejection of government proposals to create an Elected Regional 
Assembly (ERA)iii
Despite the publication of three major books on English regions (Hardill et 
al, 2006; Hazell, 2006; Sandford, 2005) the post-referendum years have been 
noteworthy for the surprising lack of critical debate
. Confirmation swiftly followed that any move towards a fully 
democratic tier of regional governance in England was now firmly off the political 
agenda (Prescott, 2004).  
iv. What debate there has been 
has resulted in a policy-centred look at alternative institutional solutions for the 
territorial governance of England. Only the re-emergence of the city-region 
concept that has seen any sustained interest. What is perhaps most notable is 
that many conclude that despite the heavy blow dealt to the regional project, 
regions remain the only viable solution to the future territorial representation of 
England (Balls et al., 2006; Hazell, 2006). It is somewhat perplexing then that a 
“lamentable lack of theoretical and conceptual grounding” (Nash, 2002: 30) 
continues to forestall understandings of the processes involved in the production 
of the English regionsv, with little attempt made to understand how and why the 
region was successfully challenged in England. The revival of interest in the 
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region does however force us to ask searching questions about the politics of 
rescaling. In particular it focuses our attention on the strategic interplay of flows, 
connections, processes, networks, agencies and institutions in the production of 
regions in England as a “site-and-scale-in-the-process-of-becoming” (Jonas, 
2006: 402). A key question arising from this is what is there to stop the region 
being successfully challenged again? It is argued that the answer lies in 
understanding the processes involved in the production of regions. 
Following a discussion of new regionalist thinking, centrally orchestrated 
regionalism and regionally orchestrated centralism are identified as key 
processes in the production of regions. The former relates to a process that is not 
new, but to one which has resulted in a noose being placed around the neck of 
successive attempts to address England’s longstanding regional ‘problem’ (cf. 
Massey, 1979). By contrast the latter is a process which has become 
increasingly prominent in the struggles relating to the production of regions in 
England over the past decade. To develop these arguments the paper draws 
upon research conducted between 2004-2006 in England’s Northwest vi . 
Interviews were conducted with forty-five national and regional stakeholders and, 
with the exception of two interviews, were all recorded and fully transcribed. 
Interviewees ranged from government ministers to local councillors, senior 
executives to mid-ranking and junior practitioners, and included representatives 
from private sector bodies such as the Confederation of British Industry. The 
analysis presented here is based on insights from these interviews with quotes 
used to capture the key points of concern expressed. Allowing centrally 
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orchestrated regionalism and regionally orchestrated centralism to be empirically 
demonstrated, the article demonstrates the continuing importance afforded to 
unravelling the processes involved in the production of spatial scale(s). 
 
2 State Rescaling and the New Regionalism 
With the nation-state appearing in decline, the emergence of a new 
regionalism catapulted the ‘region’ to the forefront of political-economic 
geography in the mid-1990s. Coming to represent the dynamic sociospatial form 
through which post-Fordist modes of capitalist accumulation were being 
mobilised and intensified, and inspired by Porterian notions of economic 
competitiveness, the rise of the regional state was so pronounced that it was said 
that we were living in a ‘regional world’ where regions were the fundamental 
building blocks for a globally interconnected capitalist state (Storper, 1997). 
Presented in this way, the region was seen as an apparent challenger to the 
primacy of the nation-state (Ohmae, 1995). A premature announcement perhaps, 
but what it highlighted was the forceful nature of the new regionalist campaign to 
emphasise the role of the ‘region’ and the ‘regional scale’ as the newly emergent 
sociospatial fix for capital accumulation after Fordism. 
Following the publication of Storper’s The Regional World (1997), Scott’s 
Regions and the World Economy (1998), Keating’s New Regionalism in Western 
Europe (1998), and Cooke and Morgan’s The Associational Economy (1998), the 
new regionalism was the buzz word for political-economists across Western 
Europe and North America. Its architects were seen to be at the forefront of 
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research into deciphering the new politics of economic development with 
transitions in the regulation and governance of contemporary capitalism and its 
territorial configuration. With academics, political leaders, and practitioners 
soaking up lucid accounts of how regions such as Baden Württemberg, Emilia-
Romagna and Silicon Valley were ‘winning’ in the post-Fordist era, the zenith of 
new regionalist inquiry was checked by a series of pertinent critiques (Lovering, 
1999; Jones, 2001; MacLeod, 2001b). In the search for a new ontological fix for 
capitalist economies, akin to the nationally configured Keynesian welfare state of 
Atlantic Fordism, it was argued that the authority afforded to the region had run 
too far ahead of sustained rational theorisation and rigorous empirical testing. 
Highlighting a number of inherent fault lines within the new regionalismvii, the 
assertion that regions were the replacement for a declining nation-state was 
revealed to be too simplistic. In these accounts, not only was the new 
regionalism identified as “a poor framework through which to grasp the real 
connections between the regionalisation of business and governance and the 
changing role of the state” (Lovering, 1999: 391) but “barring a few exceptions 
much new regionalist research had either disregarded the changing role of the 
state or implied that, amid the current round of globalisation-regionalisation, it is 
inevitably in terminal decline” (MacLeod, 2001a: 806). In sum, the new 
regionalism had swung the pendulum too far in emphasising, almost certainly 
imposing, the importance of the region as the site and scale for embedding the 
new institutions of governance after Fordism. 
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 Warning that the new regionalist desire to impose the region as the 
strategic site for capital accumulation was “deeply problematic and quite 
inadequate”, claims that “the changing functional and territorial contours of the 
state – and its intricate connections to the globalization-regionalization dialectic – 
urgently require to be established as a definitive object of inquiry” (MacLeod, 
2001a: 806) symbolised the emergence of a new tract of new regionalist 
research. Not designed to unravel the new regionalism completely, this new body 
of work acknowledged how the rise of the regional state was not necessarily or 
purposively at the expense of the state but a new form of ‘spatial selectivity’ by 
the state (Brenner, 2004; Brenner et al, 2003; Goodwin et al, 2005; Jones, 2001; 
Jones et al, 2004; MacLeod, 2001a; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999a, 1999b). As 
such this dimension of new regionalist research came to represent much more 
than just the geography of regions. More it was about understanding the 
changing territorial configuration of the state, and how the restlessness of the 
state in some ways mirrors that of capital in its search for the ‘perfect’ spatial fix. 
As a consequence, the geography of a region could not be fully explained 
through the adoption of a ‘thin’ political-economy approach, “most conspicuous in 
the failure to fully appreciate the critical role of the state in shaping the urban-
regional fabric and a related weakness in examining the asymmetries of power” 
in the production of regions (MacLeod, 2001a: 1146). But just as the pendulum 
had swung too far in the direction of the region during the period of new 
regionalist orthodoxy, the danger was that this new wave of academic endeavour 
could easily swing the pendulum back too far in the direction of the state.  
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One way that this has been averted has been as a result of increasingly 
pluralised approaches to conceptualising the production of regions; ones that go 
beyond narrow political or economic constructions to consider the political, 
economic and cultural construction of regions (Paasi, 1986; MacLeod and Jones, 
2001)viii. In regional studies, this has been most clearly articulated by Jones and 
MacLeod (2004) in their distinction between the production of ‘regional spaces’ 
and ‘spaces of regionalism’: the former referring to the production of regional 
difference by economic processes; the latter to processes of political mobilization 
around notions of regional difference (e.g. cultural identity, citizenship). 
Articulating how the production of regions requires recognition of “both a political-
economy of scale and a cultural construction of scale” Jones and MacLeod 
(2004: 448 original emphasis) question the haste with which academics appear 
inclined to jettison territorial and scalar approaches to the theory and practice of 
spatiality. Supported by their own research on England’s Southwest region, 
Jones and MacLeod call for “a retaining of territorially oriented readings of 
political economy and when appropriate their conjoining with non-territorial and/or 
relational socio-economic and political strategies” (2004: 448 emphasis added). 
In so doing they demonstrate how the production of regions remain an important 
lens through which to unravel the theory and practice of spatiality (Pike et al, 
2007). So not only does this paper distinguish between processes of centrally 
orchestrated regionalism and regionally orchestrated centralism, it emphasises 
how territorially oriented political-economy perspectives remain an important tool 
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for uncovering the ‘actual mechanisms’ through which state power and authority 
are being re-scaled (Swyngedouw, 1996). 
 
3 England’s New Regional Policy: The Historical Politics of Centrally 
Orchestrated Regionalism 
Though regionalists have long argued the case for decentralising powers 
away from London (Barlow Report, 1940; McCrone, 1969; Banks, 1971; Regional 
Policy Commission, 1996) the politics of the UK has been dominated by 
processes of centralisation. Arriving at the latter end of the twentieth century and 
buoyed by the popularity surrounding the new regionalism Blair’s Labour 
Government promised a new approach. By giving the English regions and the 
people who live in them more power to determine their own future, the Labour 
Party promised to reverse the tide of centralisation and create a modern Britain fit 
for the twenty-first century (Labour Party, 1997). But despite the rhetoric Labour’s 
decade of decentralisation has done little to reverse the trend of centralism 
(Morgan, 2002; Harrison, 2006b). Rather it is the latest in a long line of 
decentralisation policies which have been dominated, and as a result 
undermined, by centrally orchestrated regionalism ix
Constitutional politics in the UK prior to 1916 was dominated by the 
evolution of the Westminster Parliament in London from the focal point of a 
colonial empire to that of a national parliament. Strongly considered at the time 
was the offer of ‘Home Rule for All’; namely that home rule would be offered to 
. A brief historiography of 
English regional policy demonstrates this clearly. 
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Ireland, Scotland and Wales, while Westminster would become a federal 
parliament and England regionalised to avoid the domination that England would 
have within a federation. That a federal approach was never adopted is revealing 
not least because it reinforces the colonial relations between London and the 
English regions, but the failure to negotiate a constitutional settlement derived 
from a tension between ‘centralised government – and civic regionalism’ 
(Fawcett, 1919, quoted in Defries, 1927: 238). This, it could be said, is the first 
clear sign of centrally orchestrated regionalism in the development of an English 
regional policy. As a result, the subsequent period 1916-1944 was dominated by 
the problematisation of England within the context of Home Rule.  
The inter-war years marked the creation of the first regional structures in 
England. Accentuated regional disparities not only stoked the flames of hostility 
towards London, but they forced the state to intervene in the regulation of food 
supplies and labour distribution by creating regional offices for a number of 
Government departments. Derived from the theory of ‘spatial Keynesianism’, the 
use of functional regions in the immediate post-war period saw regional policies 
emerge as variants of broader initiatives from an interventionist Keynesian state 
drawing its political support from the disproportionately high levels of 
unemployment blighting the UK’s industrial regions. Continuing into the 1960s, 
Howard Wilson’s Labour Government attempted to address the underlying 
socioeconomic problems in England through the establishment of Regional 
Economic Planning Boards (REPBs). Inspired by French ‘indicative’ planning, the 
REPBs represented a top-down interventionist approach to regional policy. 
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Wholly reliant upon central government, devoid of executive powers, and 
administered by civil servants working out of London, the REPBs epitomised 
centrally orchestrated regionalism in English regional policy.  
Despite the reporting of the Kilbrandon Commission in 1973x, and the 
publication of the Labour Party’s Alternative Regional Strategy (Parliamentary 
Spokesman’s Working Group, 1982), English regionalism was virtually silenced 
by Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Government during the 1980s. Inheriting a 
stagnant economy, the 1980s was dominated by the accelerated centralisation of 
resources to preserve London’s status as the a priori global city. The result was 
that while London and the South East continued to flourish (Allen et al, 1998; 
Peck and Tickell, 1992; 1995) a rapid acceleration in the decline of 
manufacturing heralded the collapse of regional economies in the UK periphery 
(Massey, 1984). By the time John Major became leader of the Conservative 
Party and de facto Prime Minister in 1990, the political fallout from a decade of 
centralisation had provoked new territorial politics at the local and regional levels. 
Facing widespread criticism that government investment was being mismanaged, 
Major’s more accommodating form of neoliberal Conservatism saw the 
introduction of Government Offices for the Regions (GORs) in 1994. Designed to 
bring public administration and civil servants closer to the people who their 
decisions affected, the regional element to GOR activity was undermined by the 
deep suspicion held amongst regional stakeholders that GORs were deployed to 
act as the government’s ‘eyes and ears’ in the regions, alert to murmurings of 
further discontent at the privileging of London and the South East (Musson et al, 
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2005). Today GORs are a cornerstone to a new regional policy. Yet they still 
struggle to avert these suspicions. Of particular note is how even in the words of 
the Labour Party’s most committed regionalist, the benefits of GORs to central 
government prove definitive, while the benefits for the region remain merely 
suggestive: 
 
“For [Central Government] Departments, there is a huge advantage in 
having their own people, people who understand the business of 
Government, nearer the front line and taking a view across the regional 
agenda. For local stakeholders, the Government Offices can promote and 
discuss Government’s aims across a wide range of policies.” 
John Prescott (quoted in Regional Coordination Unit, 2003: 3) 
 
With GORs operational when Labour swept to power in 1997, the 
establishment of RDAs along with their indirectly-elected RAsxi represented the 
centrepiece of plans to implement a new regionalist tier of governance in 
Englandxii. However, the new institutional arrangements did not cast off concerns 
relating to the centrally orchestrated nature of regionalism in England. 
Noteworthy here was how key actors within the GOR network viewed the 
balance between centralisation and regionalisation under Blair’s new regional 
policy: 
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“Before the RDAs were established, the GORs used to style themselves 
as the voice of Whitehall in the region, and the voice of the regions in 
Whitehall. I think that since the formation of the RDAs, and actually since 
the growth of the Regional Assembly, our role has become much more 
central government in the region rather than the region in central 
government.” 
[Interview GOR Official] 
 
For many regional stakeholders this reinforced their long held belief that 
GORs were a mechanism to facilitate central intervention rather than promote 
autonomous regional action. By way of contrast, and indicative of their new 
regionalist parentage, RDAs were to be ‘economic powerhouses’ in the vanguard 
of a competitiveness revolution, resolving England’s regional economic problems 
by increasing community participation, participatory democracy, and civic pride 
through networks of social capital (Department of Environment, Transport and 
the Regions [DETR], 1997). But the promise of a new approach, of autonomous 
regional action, was to prove thinly-veiled with the century-old tradition of 
centrally orchestrated regionalism coming to the fore once more. As state-
sponsored bodies RDAs had access to resources but could only apply these in 
ways sanctioned by, and within parameters established by, central government 
(cf. Peck, 1995). RDAs were forced to ‘work within the framework of national 
policies’ (DETR, 1999a: 2), ‘support and enhance national policies’ (DETR, 
1999b: 3) and enable the ‘effective delivery of Government programmes’ (DETR, 
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1997: 1). So despite the rhetoric, centrally orchestrated regionalism ensured that 
RDAs added to a growing list of institutions whose appearance in the English 
regions was more a mechanism to facilitate central government intervention than 
to endorse autonomous regional action (Lynch, 1999; Webb and Collis, 2000). 
But recognising that centrally orchestrated regionalism was influential in the 
development of RDAs is not sufficient to explain the political-economy of RDAs. 
To do this we need to understand how centrally orchestrated regionalism affects 
the outcome of the devolutionary process. 
Despite the many on-the-ground guises that devolution takes throughout 
the world, the rhetoric of devolution remains consistent in its suggestion that an 
economic and democratic dividend can be secured by devolving power away 
from the state. This was the basis upon which the orthodoxy surrounding the new 
regionalism was established, and the incentive for the Labour Government to 
embark upon its programme of devolution and constitutional change. But missing 
in each was acknowledgement of the critical role played by the state in enabling 
or restricting the devolutionary process, defining how it operates, even governing 
its outcomes. And herein lays the contested nature of devolution. As Rodríguéz-
Pose and Gill note in their analysis of global trends in devolution: 
 
“[T]he interests of subnational and national governments tend to be at 
odds … Although national governments would prefer, ceteris paribus, to 
devolve responsibilities (authority) to their regional or state governments 
with as few accompanying resources as possible, the subnational 
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governments would prefer the opposite case. The balance between these 
extremes will depend upon the relative strength, or, in political terms, 
legitimacy, of the two tiers of government.” 
Rodríguéz-Pose and Gill (2003: 334) 
 
Acknowledging the critical role of the state in the devolutionary process 
demonstrates how the complexity of the devolution process derives from the 
interest conflicts of the actors involved at a national and regional level (cf. Peck, 
2002). Seen clearly in repeated attempts to devolve power to the English regions, 
centrally orchestrated regionalism results when the interest conflicts between 
actors at a national and regional level is weighted in favour of national level 
government. As such the relative success of devolution, measured first and 
foremost in an economic dividend and second in a democratic dividend, can be 
“significantly compromised in situations where the central government is driving, 
defining and propagating devolutionary initiatives” (Rodríguéz-Pose and Gill, 
2005: 416).  
To lesser or greater extent depending upon the extent of the imbalance, 
centrally orchestrated regionalism can diminish, even eradicate, the potential 
dividend of devolution. There are a number of reasons for this. First, 
overcentralization can lead to the devolution of responsibility without resource. In 
England, for instance, centrally orchestrated regionalism ensured that RDAs 
were established with “miniscule budgets, modest powers and a raft of 
responsibilities” (Morgan, 2002: 802). Second, constraints imposed on the 
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regional tier of government can ensure that by the time national government 
requirements have been administeredxiii
A region with relatively high levels of civic regionalism, the North East was 
viewed by government officials as a ‘safe bet’ to locate the first referendum
 there is little or no resource available to 
enable policies to be locally matched and the likelihood of innovation and 
experimentation is seriously compromised – both key to securing the economic 
dividend of devolution. All in all centrally orchestrated regionalism can seriously 
undermine the possible economic benefits of devolution. More than this it may 
ultimately undermine the possible political benefits of devolution as the regional 
tier of government is simply seen as another layer of bureaucracy. It is here that 
we pick up the story of English regional policy once more. 
Having added to a burgeoning democratic deficit, and responding to the 
levels of apathy towards the lack of authority afforded to RDAs and indirectly-
elected RAs, the UK Government confirmed that they were to offer the English 
regions the opportunity for directly-elected political representation in the form of 
ERAs. Proposals to allow each region “to truly take control of its own destiny and 
enable it to move up the economic and social prosperity ladder”, whilst being 
able “to reduce bureaucracy” and “provide a new regional level of public scrutiny 
and democratic accountability” (Prescott, quoted in DTLR, 2002: 7) were seen as 
part two of the new regionalist orthodoxy in action (cf. Jones, 2001). Again it is 
worth reflecting on the politics surrounding this major event in the history of 
English regional policy. 
xiv. In 
part this was due to the unique position that the region occupied following the 
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debates on devolution in the 1970s. With the potential for a powerful government 
to be created in Edinburgh through the Scotland Bill of 1978 seen as a real threat 
to the region, regionalism has proved to be a strong part of the North East’s 
make-up ever since (Tomaney, 1999). Fearing that a more powerful neighbour 
would deflect investment away from the North East, the regions’ Labour MPs 
promoted the need for an amendment to the Bill stipulating that a Scottish 
Assembly had to secure the support of 40% of eligible votes in a referendum – a 
figure which was not achieved. Labour MPs in the North East region were thus 
partly responsible for Scotland having to wait a further twenty years for 
devolution. Having taken this stance, and with an increasing sense of annexation 
under Thatcherism during the 1980s, the North East region became the de facto 
home of the English regional campaign (Benneworth and Tomaney, 2002; 
Tomaney, 2001). All in all the power of the new regionalist message and the 
levels of regional interest in the North East should have made the region the 
‘safe bet’ that government officials clearly assumed that it would be. But once 
more the politics and power of centrally orchestrated regionalism overwhelmed 
proposals for enabling autonomous regional action. 
Cautioning its own government against what it saw as a failure to equip 
ERAs with the tools necessary to complete the task at hand, the Office of the 
Deputy Prime Ministers’ Committee on Housing, Local Government and Regions 
(2005: 3)xv stated how: 
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“The scope of the powers and responsibilities which the Government was 
prepared to give to Assemblies was disappointing and would limit their 
effectiveness. The general power proposed for elected assemblies 
needed to be more explicit with more specific statements of their 
functions. This would provide greater clarity, and could also fire the 
imagination of the general public and potential assembly candidates.”  
   
The committee also believed that “in many key areas where power is 
devolved, central government would have remained the dominant party in the 
relationship with elected regional assemblies” (ibid., 20). Drawing a clear parallel 
with Rodríguéz-Pose and Gill’s (2003) axiom on devolution, centrally 
orchestrated regionalism ensured that what the regionalist hand of government 
was to devolve the centralist hand was going to drag back to the centre. As this 
became more apparent in the months leading up to the North East referendum, 
and given the perceived affect of centrally orchestrated regionalism on the 
dividend of devolution, “the problems rather than the potential came to be at the 
forefront of voters’ minds” (Rallings and Thrasher, 2006: 935). 
In many ways this is a well rehearsed argument that goes far beyond 
England, with regions eager to acquire new authority and a resolute nation-state 
determined not to cede power (Rodríguéz-Pose and Gill, 2003). But the effect 
that this has on other scalar relationships remains narrowly constructed around 
whether the state, having successfully fought off the regional campaign for more 
powers to be devolved from the state through centrally orchestrated regionalism, 
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will sanction the upscaling of authority and resource from the local state to 
generate meaningful economic prosperity. In these accounts and others, RDAs 
are nearly always treated as individual regional agencies or as a national 
collective. To date little or no attempt has been made to explore the ‘actual 
mechanisms’ (Swyngedouw, 1996) through which functions are variously 
attacked, defended, upscaled and downscaled through the RDA themselves. It is 
to this that the paper now turns through a detailed focus on one English RDA in 
particular – the Northwest Development Agency. 
 
4 England’s Northwest: A Window on Regionally Orchestrated 
Centralism 
England’s Northwest has been an important lens through which to observe 
the processes involved in the production of regions over recent years (Burch and 
Holliday, 1993; Deas, 2006; Deas and Ward, 2000; Jones and MacLeod, 2002; 
Tickell et al, 1995). This is in large part a reflection on the shear size and 
diversity of the region. Comprising five subregions, Cheshire, Cumbria, Greater 
Manchester, Lancashire, and Merseyside, England’s Northwest has a population 
of 7 million and an economy grossing £106 billion per annum. To put this into 
perspective, the regions’ population not only outstrips that of Scotland and Wales 
(5.3 and 3 million respectively) but it also exceeds that of a number of European 
states – Denmark (5.5 million), Finland (5.3 million), Norway (4.5 million) and the 
Republic of Ireland (4 million). Second only to London and the South East in 
England, a turnover of £106 billion is higher than fourteen European Union 
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countries (including Denmark and Finland), and leaves the regions’ economy as 
the twelfth largest in Europe (NWDA, 2006). As one commentator recently noted, 
“the North West region is a country within a country such is its economic clout, its 
educational and research base, the strength and innovation of its industries and 
the beauty of its countryside” (Watts, 2007: no pagination)xvi
Forced into a rapid restructuring of its economic activity during the 1980s, 
the North West region witnessed renewed political lobbying for an increased 
hand in managing its own destiny (Burch and Holliday, 1993). With local attempts 
. But this only tells 
one half of the story. 
A legacy of the regions industrial past, and in particular the 
deindustrialisation of the North West economy following the collapse of Atlantic 
Fordism, have ensured that despite experiencing an economic upturn, on key 
indicators the region continues to underperform. For over a decade the region’s 
Gross Value Added per head has stood 11% lower than the England average. Of 
the fifty most deprived districts listed in the 2007 English Indices of Deprivation, 
the North West region contained eighteen (36%) (Communities and Local 
Government, 2007). Of the twenty-five most deprived districts fourteen are to be 
found in the region (56%), while the five most deprived districts (Liverpool, 
Knowsley, Blackpool, Manchester and Burnley) are all located in the North West. 
These are alarming figures for a region that during the nineteenth century 
exhibited all the localised synergy of entrepreneurship, adventure and 
technological advancement that is so cherished in today’s quicksilver global 
economy.  
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to break the spiral of (economic) decline exhausted, the initial signs of a regional 
lobby began to emerge at the beginning of the 1990s when a number of 
influential actors realised that adopting an insular and parochial outlook was 
proving to be a major hindrance to the North West’s economic recovery. This 
coalition of instrumental actors came together in 1992 to formally create the 
North West Regional Association, a regionally representative body charged with 
formulating a strategic framework for enabling the region’s economic recovery 
(NWRA, 1993). Emblematic of a newly emergent local and regional politics, the 
NWRA enabled the region to present a coherent approach to economic 
development and to exert what little influence they could on the centralisers in 
the Conservative Government in London. In contrast to previous regional 
institutions, the uniqueness of the NWRA was that it was created in the region, 
by the region, for the regionxvii
If the creation of Government Office North West (GONW) offered a quasi-
constitutional settlement, the establishment of the NWDA in 1999 signalled the 
arrival of new regionalist inspired political praxis to England’s Northwest. Dripping 
with the new regionalist slogans of ‘raising economic competitiveness’, ‘driving 
forward regeneration’ and ‘accelerating growth’, the NWDA promised a ‘regional 
renaissance’ (NWDA, 1999). Responsible for preparing the North West’s 
Regional Economic Strategy (RES) – an ambitious and visionary document that 
sets out the spatial and thematic priorities for promoting economic development 
. An emerging and increasingly formalised regional 
lobby was one reason that lay behind the decision to establish GORs in the 
English regions. 
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in the region till 2020 (NWDA, 1999)xviii 
At the outset the NWDA was no different to the other English RDAs in 
creating a two-tier corporate governance structure, establishing an institutional 
presence both regionally and subregionally. At the centre of NWDA activity is 
Renaissance House in Warrington. Home to the NWDAs Board, Executive 
Management Team, and Policy Directorates, Renaissance House is the regional 
headquarters of the NWDA. The control centre for all aspects of the NWDAs 
activity in the region, Renaissance House is the critical interface for negotiating 
the economic future of the region with government ministers, political leaders, 
– the NWDA is the largest funded RDA 
nationally with a budget of £477.9 million (2007-08). Initially this sounds 
promising, but a legacy of centrally orchestrated regionalism in England ensured 
that the NWDAs budget pales into insignificance when compared with that of 
other UK devolved territories where the legitimacy of the regional tier of 
government is much stronger – Scotland’s new parliament building alone cost 
£431 million. Further compounded by the complex nature of the North West’s 
territorial composition and the fragmented nature of its regional polity (Burch and 
Holliday, 1993; Giordano, 2002; Jones and MacLeod, 2002; Tickell et al, 1995) 
this raised questions as to the ability of the NWDA to govern a region as large 
and diverse as the North West, let alone to build sufficient capacity to manage 
expectation and deliver a regional renaissance. But to understand this complexity 
we must first understand how the NWDA operates, and more specifically, how 
functions are variously attacked, defended, upscaled and downscaled through 
the RDA itself. 
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civil servants and policymakers in London. Be it as strategy-maker, decision-
maker, negotiator, or coordinator, Renaissance House is the beating heart of 
regional economic development in the North West.  
Below this, the NWDA established an institutional presence, in the form of 
Area Offices, in each of the five subregions. Each Area Office was designed to 
represent the interface between the strategic decision-making hub of the agency 
(Renaissance House), key stakeholders, and local delivery partners. Without 
sufficient resource to be a strong delivery agent themselves – a legacy of 
centrally orchestrated regionalism – the interface with local delivery partners 
through their Area Office’s was deemed fundamental to ensuring that that the 
NWDA had the capacity to deliver programmes in support of the RES and to go 
some way to delivering a regional renaissance. Working in and through their 
Area Offices, the NWDA were, to lesser or greater extent, forced to adopt a much 
stronger metagovernance role in the region – as coordinators of coordination – 
constantly negotiating with local and regional partners, both public and private, to 
ensure that what partners were delivering on the ground complements and 
delivers against the objectives set out in the RES (cf. Whitehead, 2003).  
Operating with its own two-tier decentralised governance structure means 
that the NWDA had, in principle at least, created the institutional capacity for 
further devolving state power from the region to each of the subregions. This 
suggests that the principle of drilling down policy implementation and decision-
making to the region would continue to filter down to the local level – and by 
design enable local stakeholders to engage and feed into regional decision-
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making through the upscaling of local interests. But just as centrally orchestrated 
regionalism has ensured that the new regionalist rhetoric and the principles of 
devolution are not implemented nationally without a contest between regions and 
the state, the experience of the NWDA over the past decade suggests that 
another process, regionally orchestrated centralism, has developed as a result of 
the contest between the regional and subregional tiers of government in the 
North West. 
As the years have passed the NWDA have grown into their role as 
coordinator and negotiator of the region’s economic future, successfully 
embedding the agency within the complex web of governance structures 
operating in and through the region. But the past ten years have not been without 
their difficulties. From the outset the NWDA were to govern a region whose 
boundaries were designed for the political and administrative convenience of 
government officials in the 1940s, rather than from any historical or cultural 
inclinations xix. Not unique in this regard (each English RDA faces the same 
problem) the North West suffers more than most because not only is the 
population and economy of the region comparable with that of some European 
states, but remarkably, just one of the five subregions, Greater Manchester, has 
a population equitable with that of the entire North East region of England, while 
the geographical area of another subregion, Cumbria, is also comparable. Put 
simply, if the North West is a ‘country within a country’ (Watts, 2007) then some 
of its subregions are ‘regions within a region’. To create a regional blueprint for 
economic development, co-ordinate corporate activity, and establish the agency 
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in a region of such size and diversity was clearly going to be a challenging 
agenda for the NWDA. 
 When the NWDA was established in 1999 it had three immediate tasks: 
set up the agency, produce the RES, and prioritise their regional spend. Task 
one was completed with minimal discomfortxx. Tasks two and three, however, 
began to present early signs of regionally orchestrated centralism penetrating the 
agency. Though high-levels of consultation were undertaken to produce the first 
RES, the political pressures imposed by national government to get the agency 
operational and the NWDAs desire to demonstrate its ability to provide 
leadership in the region ensured that a very strong lead was provided by the 
executive arm of the agency. Recognising the narrow parameters within which 
the NWDA could operate stakeholders from across the region accepted the 
authority granted to the Executive team at Renaissance House to provide such a 
strong lead in the production of the first RES (NWDA, 1999). The result was a 
strategy that could not be faulted for its aspiration and vision, but reading more 
like a compilation of ideas than a unifying plan, the synergy that could result from 
such an arrangement was lost. As one regional commentator noted: 
 
“In its infancy [the NWDA] started off wanting to be all things to everyone. I 
think it’s a bit like when kid’s start school and they want to be friends with 
everyone in the class. I think that the NWDA were like that. They wanted 
to be friends with everyone.” 
[Interview with North West Business Sector Representative] 
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Not alone in this respect, the North West was one of many regions to 
produce a strategy high on aspiration and vision but low on regional priorities 
(Benneworth, 1999) – one of a number of outcomes which resulted from centrally 
orchestrated regionalism. But for the North West, its shear size and diversity 
ensured that the knock-on effects of trying to be ‘all things to all people’ 
snowballed. Producing such a wide-ranging strategy not only raised expectation 
amongst practitioners that their project would be deemed beneficial to regional 
development, given that any initiative could be cross-referenced with a priority 
outline in the RES, but it left the NWDA overwhelmed with project proposals 
none of which failed to get past the initial stages of the appraisal system. This 
stretched the NWDAs management and staffing structures, placed a vast burden 
on its limited budgetary resources, and stoked the already high-levels of 
expectation amongst local partners that their project would receive financial 
support from the agency. This can be seen in the mindset adopted by each 
subregion in the early years of the NWDA: 
 
“You have absolutely hit the nail right on the head. The mindset until two 
or three-years ago was, the NWDA has something like £420 million a year 
to shell out, there are five subregions, so we should all get £80 
million…And if we are not getting £80 million, we are being badly done to, 
so we shout, we bang on at them, we moan and we whinge till we get it.” 
[Interview with North West Subregional Political Leader] 
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For a new agency establishing itself in the region, it was natural, but 
ultimately unsustainable, for the NWDA to emphasise the expectation of 
economic rewards from devolution despite the reality of having little resource to 
deliver this. Somewhat inevitably it came to pass that in 2003 the NWDA faced a 
major funding crisis. Walking into an agency that had lost track of how much 
money they had committed to projects, the NWDAs new Chief Executive, Steven 
Broomhead, unearthed a serious budgetary deficit. Even graver than many 
expected, Broomhead and his staff were forced to sift through over 3000 files to 
discover that the NWDAs funding commitments for 2004 were already £200 
million over and above their £430 million budget. For the next two years (2005-6) 
the NWDA were locked-in to a programme and their portfolio of activity was filled 
to the brim (and beyond) with projects that they had committed to fund. With little 
or no headroom to take on new activity the NWDA had no capacity (financially at 
least) to steer regional economic development.  
With the new regionalist rhetoric and the principles of devolution premised 
on ensuring the necessary flexibility to shape economic development in 
accordance with local and regional (rather than national) priorities, for the NWDA 
to be locked into a fixed programme for three years provided a clear indication 
that the devolution of powers to the regional level was no guarantee of success. 
A difficult period for the NWDA ensued, with accusations of mismanagement 
prevalent:  
 
 31 
“It is unbelievable. If a local authority behaved in this way it would be 
crucified. It’s an absolute shambles. They do not know what they have 
said yes to, or even what they have turned down.” 
 Quoted in Kelly and Gleeson (2004: no pagination) 
 
The funding crisis which enveloped the NWDA was seen, first and 
foremost, to be the result of mismanagement. But there is another side to this 
story, one which has relevance to a much wider audience than those interested 
in the politics of a regional agency located in North West England. Take a step 
back and the NWDAs funding crisis reflects the outcome of centrally orchestrated 
regionalism. Under resourced for the task at hand but striving to live up to its 
responsibility, it was not simply mismanagement of funding by the NWDA but the 
mismanagement of funding as an outcome of centrally orchestrated regionalism 
which set the conditions for the ensuing financial crisis to foster. Albeit an 
extreme example – the NWDA is the only English RDA to experience a crisis on 
this magnitude – it does begin to illustrate the knock-on effects of centrally 
orchestrated regionalism, and these effects do not stop here. 
Today the NWDA are much more rigorous and challenging in the 
appraisal of projects. Where stakeholders got what they wanted (most notably 
finance) from the agency in the past, the NWDA are now less likely to support 
projects in this way. Financial support is now focused on a smaller number of 
what the agency term transformational or signature projects – projects or actions 
that the region must prioritise to really drive growth – which leaves the majority of 
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projects unfunded by the agency. Increasingly the NWDA contribute to projects 
by using their expertise, knowledge and influence over a range of 
government/non-government bodies to enable project leaders to explore, and 
more importantly, secure funding from other sources. This marked transformation 
in the role and outlook of the NWDA is expressed by one of its employees: 
 
“It is forcing partners to be a bit cleverer in their own thinking. It is amazing 
that once they realise that no is a no, how many projects still happen with 
some innovative thinking around the issues. All of a sudden they have got 
the funding from elsewhere. If the project is sufficiently good and 
generates the outputs, there will be other funding partners who will step 
into our shoes. It is amazing how many private developers will take a 
chance and do the projects themselves…[He goes on to add]…There are 
a number of schemes that came to us, we said no, and all of a sudden you 
are passing them six-months later in the car and it is getting built. You 
speak to your partners in the local authority and you find out how it is 
being done. It is amazing!” 
[Interview with NWDA Programme Manager]  
 
 Articulated clearly in the words of this NWDA employee, there was a real 
sense that the agency had made a breakthrough. Out of crisis had emerged 
hope for the new agency. Ironic in some senses but this was to be the positive 
outcome of centrally orchestrated regionalism in the North West. It eased the 
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pressure on their own limited resource, with the emphasis placed once more on 
the emergence of a metagovernance role for the NWDA in delivering regional 
economic development. The problem, however, was that regionally orchestrated 
centralism remained present and was continuing to determine the degree to 
which the NWDA could deliver the economic dividend of devolution. 
Just as the Labour Government restricted the capacity for autonomous 
regional action in establishing RDAs, a legacy of the funding crisis was that the 
executive arm of the NWDA invoked their strong hand to restrict the capacity of 
their Area Office’s to operate independently from Renaissance House. As two 
project managers noted, the disempowerment of the Area Office’s rendered them 
largely ineffectual: 
 
“To be frank, I have more contact with Warrington than I do with the Area 
Office. The Area Office is out on a limb because all their money that is 
currently going through them is really controlled through Warrington. I 
mean they can’t even get a relatively small decision approved at Area 
Manager level, which must be very frustrating. There is expertise there but 
it is just not used.” 
 [Interview with Urban Project Manager] 
 
“The fact that the NWDA happen to have a subregional office not very far 
from where we are now means absolutely nothing to us. Our first contact 
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is always through Warrington – it is where the money is, and it is where 
the people who actually make the decisions are at the end of the day.” 
[Interview with Inward Investment Manager] 
 
 This is not without precedent. Despite little previous attention, a focus on 
the internal politics of the NWDA suggests that the politics of devolution not only 
extends beyond the centre-region axis, but moreover, this subregional politics of 
devolution often resembles, parallels, even mirrors that which has been so lucidly 
articulated in the devolution literature. Most notable in this latest scenario is that 
“the decentralization of ‘responsibilities’ without accompanying power, authority, 
autonomy or resources, offers perfect conditions for the fostering of spare, 
unproductive, or even wasteful governmental capacity” (Rodríguéz-Pose and Gill, 
2005: 416).  
 The NWDAs response to their precarious financial position was to further 
centralise their activity. With the aim of taking a firmer control over the decision-
making process, administering the public purse, and controlling even more 
activity centrally, the NWDA truncated many of their external linkages. Activity 
which had previously been conducted in the Area Office’s was now to be 
conducted centrally. Serving to undermine Area Office’s even more, the 
centralization of activity further weakened their position within the agency itself 
but also in their respective subregions. This was to leave the agency’s Area 
Offices in the same position regionally as the NWDA found themselves nationally 
– isolated. This was confirmed by a high-ranking officer working in one of the 
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agency’s Area Office’s, who when asked whether their role and institutional 
capacity had increased over time (as the principles of devolution would suggest) 
explained how their autonomy was continuing to be constrained by regionally 
orchestrated centralism: 
 
“Nine months ago I would have probably answered yes to that. One of the 
things that we have done in the last six months is to look at the Agency’s 
funding commitments and what we have realised is that we have got more 
commitments than we thought we had. So what has happened in the last 
four or five months is that the flexibility and the delegated authority that 
Area Managers in the past had to approve funding decisions have been 
drawn back into the centre. So we have lost some flexibility in the way we 
operate as a result of that. All the decisions that we take now, and if we 
have got to approve an activity in the subregion, it has to be formalised at 
Renaissance House.”  
[Interview with NWDA Area Office Official] 
 
 Not dissimilar to how centrally orchestrated regionalism demonstrates the 
capacity of the state to (dis)empower their regions, regionally orchestrated 
centralism demonstrates the capacity of the region (through agencies such as 
RDAs) to exercise its scalar power to (dis)empower their subregions. To deploy 
the language of Rodríguéz-Pose and Gill (2003) once more, although the NWDA 
would prefer, ceteris paribus, to devolve responsibilities (authority) to their Area 
 36 
Offices with as few accompanying resources as possible, the Area Offices would 
prefer the opposite case. In this regard regionally orchestrated centralism can be 
said to mirror centrally orchestrated regionalism. What remains indeterminate in 
all of this though is not that regionally orchestrated centralism exists, but to what 
degree its existence can be attributed to the effects of centrally orchestrated 
regionalism.  
 
5 Concluding Comments 
This paper has offered two key insights into the processes involved in the 
production of regions. ‘Centrally orchestrated regionalism’ derives from a well 
rehearsed debate about the rescaling of authority from nation-states to regions 
and the degree to which the central state are prepared to devolve power, while 
‘regionally orchestrated centralism’ documents the rescaling of authority between 
the region and its subregions. Reflecting the importance of process-based 
approaches to scale (Swyngedouw, 1997a), both illustrate how particular 
material structures and processes have become (temporarily) fixed at or around 
the regional scale and how they are becoming unfixed at other scales (Jonas, 
2006). Both also appear to stand in opposition to the principles of devolution, and 
in this regard, challenge the new regionalist rhetoric that regions can revitalise 
their own political-economic space(s). This it is argued has implications that have 
much wider relevance than simply those experienced in the English context. 
Recognising that the recent devolutionary trend is not uniform (see 
Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 2003), the degree to which centrally orchestrated 
regionalism is prevalent is clearly nationally specific, while within that national 
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context regionally orchestrated centralism will be regionally specific. All the same 
it is suggested that centrally orchestrated regionalism and regionally orchestrated 
centralism can be identified as important processes and/or outcomes of the 
global trend towards devolution. Moreover, the emphasis has been placed on 
exploring the processes and outcomes of the devolutionary trend that go beyond 
well-rehearsed arguments on the relationship between state and region. Indeed it 
may be necessary to consider regionally orchestrated centralism as being 
subregionally specific, for evidence suggests that the emergence of a new 
regionalism has coincided with the resurgence of another territorial form, that of 
the city.  
The new city-regionalism has enjoyed a rapid rise to prominence, with 
city-regions heralded as “the basic motors of the global economy” and “territorial 
platforms for much of the post-Fordist economy” (Scott, 2001: 4). Given that 
regions have not been replaced, but joined by cities, this represents a subtle shift 
in the spatial focus of capitalism but one which has important connotations. First, 
the re-emergence of city-regions illustrates how particular material structures and 
processes are becoming fixed at or around the city-regional scale and how they 
are becoming unfixed at other scales (Jonas, 2006). Second, it has been noted 
elsewhere how the same lines of weakness which undermined the new 
regionalism are present in the new city-regionalism – implying that they have 
simply been rescaled or collapsed into the new focus on city-regions (Harrison, 
2007). Third, while the emphasis on increasing flows and connectivity through 
cross-border networks under the new city-regionalism can be seen to represent a 
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move towards non-territorial, networked and relational conceptualisations of 
spatiality, the territorial structures of governance remain firmly in situ. And finally, 
with this increasing focus on cities within regions it could be that the effects of 
regionally orchestrated centralism are spatially uneven between subregions 
depending on the generic nature of each subregion (i.e. urban/rural) and the 
degree to which each subregion is pushing the city-region agenda. With 
interesting debates currently taking place on the region and city-region concepts 
in urban and regional studies (see inter alia Harding, 2007; Harrison, 2007; 
IJURR, 2007; Regional Studies, 2007; Jonas and Ward, 2007) it remains clear 
that uncovering the politically-charged processes involved in the production of 
subnational space remains an urgent task. 
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i The notion of a ‘human geography without scale’ was first posited by Sallie Marston, John Paul 
Jones III and Keith Woodward in 2005 (Marston et al, 2005). Critiquing the dominant hierarchical 
conception of scale – the notion of a spatial scaffold running from the local to the global, up and 
down which social processes flow – and arguing that the perceived rigidities of this version of 
scale cannot be overcome simply by adding to or integrating it with horizontally networked 
theorizing, Marston et al propose to eliminate scale as a concept in human geography. Instead 
they propose a different ontology – a flat ontology – which so flattens scale as to render the 
concept unnecessary. 
ii This paper deals solely with subnational forms of region. This is in contrast to the norm in 
academic traditions like international relations theory where the region is habitually deployed to 
define an area comprising more than one nation-state e.g. the Baltic Sea Region or the Middle 
East. 
iii 78% of voters voted against the government proposal. More detail on the politics behind the 
referendum is beyond the scope of this paper, but see Rallings and Thrasher (2006) and Tickell 
et al (2005). 
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iv Most commentators were supporters (in principle) of ERAs and in their eyes “a vote of such 
magnitude against the idea was wholly unexpected” (Sandford, 2005: 1). Post-referendum many 
commentators have distanced themselves from the events of November 4, 2004. 
v There are a few exceptions to this, notably Allen et al (1998) and Jones and MacLeod (2004). 
vi Funded by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) this paper draws upon a 
three-research project entitled ‘Regions in focus: a new regionalist interpretation of England’s 
Northwest’ (Grant Number PTA-030-2002-01629). 
vii For an overview see Harrison (2006a). 
viii This plural approach to conceptualising space was also an underlying theme in the emergence 
of a debate on city-regions which took place in this journal. Arguing that the city-region concept 
has been constructed around a rather narrow set of empirical and theoretical issues relating to 
exchange, interspatial competition and globalisation, Jonas and Ward (2007) introduced an 
alternative approach to investigating and understanding geographies of city-regionalism, centred 
on struggles around social reproduction and political participation (see also, IJURR, 2007; 
Harding, 2007). 
ix  The concept of ‘centrally orchestrated regionalism’ has echoes of Peck’s use of ‘centrally 
orchestrated localism’ to explain how local state-sponsored bodies in England were constrained 
by the controlling hand of central government under the Conservative Government of Margaret 
Thatcher during the 1980s (Peck, 1995). 
x Set up in response to the growing demands for home rule or full independence for Scotland and 
Wales, The Royal Commission on the Constitution (referred to as the Kilbrandon Commission) 
was a long-standing royal commission set up in the latter years of Harold Wilson’s Labour 
Government to examine the structures of the constitution in the United Kingdom. The final report 
formed the basis for proposals to afford Scotland and Wales devolutionary powers, but these 
were subsequently rejected in a referendum. 
xi Indirectly-elected Regional Assemblies were created by the Labour Government to shadow the 
RDAs. Charged with providing regional accountability, RAs have struggled to establish 
themselves within the regions. Under-resourced, unelected, and unclear of their role, RAs are 
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regarded as remarkably weak organisations and are due to be wound up in the next couple of 
years. Beyond the scope of this paper, the failure of RAs is yet another outcome and legacy of 
centrally orchestrated regionalism in England. 
xii It is worth recalling that “in England, Blair [did] not expect devolution to go beyond regional 
development agencies and joint boards of local councillors to oversee them'' (Rentoul, 1996: 467). 
xiii In England this included an extensive array of targets which RDAs had to meet, and also their 
funding in those early years was received in departmental silos such that there was no flexibility 
to move money around (in order to meet local and regional needs) and had to be used to meet 
those department’s national targets. 
xiv The government’s choice of the North East as a ‘safe bet’ region was supported by a BBC 
opinion poll suggesting that 72% of the electorate supported the creation of an ERA (BBC, 2002).  
xv That it was an ODPM committee is important for within government it was the ODPM who were 
the driving-force behind proposals to create ERAs - not only was the department headed by John 
Prescott, the self-styled ‘governor of the regions’ but it housed the ‘Regional Assemblies’ division 
who had responsibility for drafting the proposals that were finally put to the people of the North 
East region. 
xvi This is an important point to reflect upon in that it strikes a chord, albeit in a slightly different 
way, with Peter Taylor’s fascinating insight into the North of England being England’s ‘foreign 
country within’ (Taylor, 1993). Writing at a time when much discussion centred on the legacy of 
Margaret Thatcher’s eleven-year tenure as Prime Minister, Taylor suggested that the real and 
authentic England was to be located in the south of England, with northern England – still reeling 
from deindustrialisation – seen as a contested place. That a region such as the North West is, 
fifteen years later, making headlines in such positive terms for being a ‘country within a country’ 
signals a remarkable transformation. 
xvii The rise of a regional lobby in the North West and the other English regions signalled the 
emergence of a new local and regional territorial politics. As noted in the previous section this 
new politics was one reason, alongside the emergence of discourses around a ‘Europe of the 
Regions’ and a criticism that government investment was being wasted through lack of 
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coordination and ineffectual decision making, which lay behind the Major Government’s decision 
to establish GORs in 1994. 
xviii Two subsequent revisions to the RES have been published (NWDA, 2003, 2006). 
xix For Jones and MacLeod (2004: 434) this represented the “staggering lack of imagination” 
punctuating Labour’s thinking over the territorial representation of England. 
xx There were only two clear points of contention. The first was the choice of location for the 
regional headquarters of the NWDA. With two large metropolitan centres in the region, choosing 
either Manchester or Liverpool was deemed too political, so a neutral location (equidistant from 
each city) was found in Warrington. The second point of contention surrounded the presence of 
the NWDA in Cumbria. The largest subregion by geographic area, Cumbria is also an extremely 
fragmented territory. To reflect this the NWDA decided to established two Area Office’s in 
Cumbria. 
